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A FATAL FLAW: THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
FURTHER RESTRICTS LIABILITY IN  
10B-5 PRIVATE SECURITY FRAUD  
CASES IN REESE v. BP 
Abstract: On June 28, 2011, in Reese v. BP Explorations (Alaska) Inc., the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that plaintiffs could not 
bring certain securities fraud claims relating to a burst in an Alaskan oil 
pipeline, because the plaintiffs failed to show that the defendant had the 
“ultimate authority” for the allegedly fraudulent SEC filings. In so doing, 
the court continued a recent trend in securities fraud cases of making it 
more difficult for plaintiffs to bring claims. This Comment argues that al-
though the Ninth Circuit’s ruling was consistent with Supreme Court 
precedent, it may allow otherwise liable parties to escape liability, and the 
decision expands the growing trend of reducing the scope of private ac-
tions under SEC Rule 10b-5. 
Introduction 
 In the wake of the Great Depression, Congress enacted statutory 
safeguards to protect securities investors from buying overvalued secu-
rities.1 The primary way in which Congress sought to achieve this goal 
was by implementing a system of periodic disclosure.2 Under this sys-
tem, pertinent information about each security is made public, thus 
allowing the free market to synthesize the information and price securi-
ties properly, and preventing the need to ban bad securities.3 Accord-
ingly, Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, which established standards for disclosure and 
                                                                                                                      
1 See Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77bbbb); 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp 
(2006)). 
2 See Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 
Stan. L. Rev. 385, 409 (1990); see also Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mecha-
nisms of Market Efficiency, 70 Va. L. Rev. 549, 601 (1984) (discussing the efficiencies of plac-
ing the burden of disclosure on the issuers of securities). 
3 See Thel, supra note 2, at 409; see also Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 601 (dis-
cussing the effects of mandatory disclosure on the costs of gathering and distributing in-
formation). 
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created the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to enforce and 
regulate the process.4 
 Yet it is not always clear whether and to what extent private parties 
can recover for losses suffered as a result of another party’s failure to 
comply with SEC regulations.5 Clarifying this confusion somewhat, the 
Supreme Court has held that SEC Rule 10b-5, promulgated under sec-
tion 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, creates a private 
right of action, thereby allowing injured parties to seek damages from a 
party who uses deceptive practices in the sale of a security.6 The Su-
preme Court has construed this private right of action narrowly and 
has since further clarified those subject to liability under Rule 10b-5.7 
 In Reese v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit dismissed certain securities fraud claims brought un-
der Rule 10b-5.8 Although the Ninth Circuit could have dismissed the 
claim under various theories, it reasoned that recent Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, which further defined those who can be liable for mak-
ing a false statement under Rule 10b-5, was sufficient to dismiss the 
claims.9 According to the Ninth Circuit, the fact that the defendant, BP 
Explorations (Alaska)(“BPXA”), had a contractual duty to complete the 
SEC filing, rather than a statutory duty, was “fatal” to the plaintiff’s claim 
that BPXA’s misrepresentations caused the stock in a royalty trust to be 
overvalued, thereby harming investors.10 
 Part I of this Comment outlines the pertinent factual and proce-
dural background of Reese.11 Then, Part II explains the recent history of 
third-party liability under Rule 10b-5, focusing on the Supreme Court’s 
evolving jurisprudence and how the Ninth Circuit applied that reason-
ing.12 Finally, Part III argues that the Ninth Circuit has made it more 
                                                                                                                      
4 See 15 U.S.C. § 78d. 
5 Compare Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 191 
(1994) (concluding that lawyers or accountants may be liable in private securities fraud 
suits), with Janus Capital Grp. Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2304–05 (2011) 
(concluding that an investment advisor was not liable in a private securities fraud suit). 
6 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011); Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. 
Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971). 
7 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5; see Janus Capital Grp., 131 S. Ct. at 2302; Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 
191. 
8 Reese v. BP Exploration (Ala.) Inc., 643 F.3d 681, 694 (9th Cir. 2011). 
9 Id. at 693 n.8. 
10 Id. 
11 See infra notes 14–38 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 39–55 and accompanying text. 
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difficult for plaintiffs to prevail against parties that may previously have 
been considered liable in private securities fraud cases.13 
I. BP Did Not “Make” the Statement 
 In 1989, BPXA established a royalty trust, BP Prudhoe Bay Royalty 
Trust (the “Trust”), to distribute the profits from BPXA’s oil production 
in Alaska’s Prudhoe Bay region.14 The agreement establishing the Trust 
provided that BPXA and the trustee were “authorized to make and 
[would] be responsible” for all legally required filings with the SEC.15 
Shares of the Trust were publicly traded on the New York Stock Ex-
change.16 In its quarterly SEC filings, the Trust included a copy of the 
Overriding Royalty Conveyance agreement (the “ORC Agreement”), 
which BPXA and the trustees had entered into at the creation of the 
Trust.17 In the ORC Agreement, BPXA promised to “conduct and carry 
on the development, exploration, production, maintenance and opera-
tion of [Prudhoe Bay] with reasonable and prudent business judgment, 
in accordance with . . . good oil and gas field practices, as a reasonable 
and prudent operator” (the “Prudent Operator Promise”).18 
 On August 6, 2006, BPXA discovered a leak in an Alaskan oil pipe-
line under its operation.19 Allegedly, the leak was due to internal corro-
sion, and might have been preventable if BPXA had taken standard oil 
industry precautions.20 After noticing the leak, BPXA shut down a 
number of pipelines and related oil production until the leak was cor-
rected.21 In response to this leak and an earlier leak in the same region 
of Alaska, BPXA pled guilty to one violation of the Clean Water Act.22 
 Claude Reese and a class of similarly situated investors (the “plain-
tiffs”) had purchased shares of BP’s common stock (not stock in the 
Trust) during the class period.23 The plaintiffs alleged that the pipeline 
leak and related shutdown cost billions in BP’s market capitalization.24 
                                                                                                                      
13 See infra notes 56–74 and accompanying text. 
14 Reese, 643 F.3d at 685. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 686. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 684 
20 See Reese, 643 F.3d at 684. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged BPXA should have used 
so-called “pigs,” or pipeline inspection gauges. Id. at 684 n.1. 
21 Id. at 684. 
22 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(c)(1), 1321(b)(3) (2006); Reese, 643 F.3d at 684. 
23 Reese, 643 F.3d at 684. 
24 Id. at 685–86. 
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Further, they noted that the Trust had included with its SEC filings the 
ORC Agreement, which contained the Prudent Operator Promise.25 
Accordingly, by allowing the leaks to occur and failing to follow pru-
dent operator procedures, BPXA made a knowing and material mis-
representation, constituting securities fraud under Section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5, according to the 
plaintiffs.26 
 The claims against BPXA survived a motion to dismiss before the 
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington.27 Then, the 
trial judge certified two questions to the Ninth Circuit for interlocutory 
appeal: (1) whether a party could be liable for securities fraud when 
the only statement attributable to that party was in a contract filed with 
the SEC by a different party; and (2) whether admission of guilt to a 
misdemeanor could be used as evidence of scienter when the standard 
demands reckless or intentional misconduct.28 For the first question, a 
panel of the Ninth Circuit held in favor of BPXA, dismissing the securi-
ties fraud charges that were based on the ORC Agreement’s Prudent 
Operator Promise.29 Yet, the panel left the second question unresolved; 
because it dismissed the case by reasoning that the alleged misstate-
ment was not attributable to BPXA, it did not need to address the ques-
tion of scienter.30 
 A plaintiff, to state a claim for a private securities fraud, must show 
a “material misrepresentation (or omission).”31 Under the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s jurisprudence, the representation must “affirmatively create[] an 
impression of a state of affairs that differs in a material way from the 
one that actually exists.”32 
 Under this interpretation, the plaintiffs faced two hurdles when 
asserting that the Prudent Operator Promise was a material misrepre-
sentation for the purposes of a security frauds action: the plaintiffs had 
to show both that the misrepresentation concerned present affairs, and 
                                                                                                                      
25 Reese, 643 F.3d at 685–86. 
26 Id. at 685; see 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011). The plaintiffs 
raised a number of claims against BP, its subsidiaries, and its officials; only the claims relat-
ing to the Trust’s SEC filings were disposed of by the Ninth Circuit in this decision. Reese, 
643 F.3d at 685–86. 
27 Reese, 643 F.3d at 687. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 687, 694. 
30 Id. at 694. 
31 Id. at 685; see 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
32 Reese, 643 F.3d at 687 (quoting Brody v. Transitional Hosps. Corp., 280 F.3d 997, 
1006 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
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that BPXA had made it.33 First, the court held that the Prudent Opera-
tor Promise did not describe a state of affairs in the present, but rather 
described how BPXA would act in the future.34 Second, because the 
SEC disclosures containing the Prudent Operator Promise were filed by 
the Trust, and not BPXA, the court held that BPXA could not have 
“made” the statements as required by the Rule 10b-5.35 
                                                                                                                     
 The first deficiency, by itself, was enough to dismiss the claims.36 In 
addition, the second problem, that the Trust, and not BPXA, was the 
party to “make” the statements, was fatal.37 Yet although the question 
fundamental to the outcome of a case, it is still unclear who can “make” 
a fraudulent statement.38 
II. Who Can “Make” a Statement Under Rule 10b-5 
 Prior to 1994, to state a cause of action, a plaintiff was not required 
to show that the opposing party had “made” the misrepresentation; it 
was sufficient if the party had aided and abetted the maker by provid-
ing substantial assistance.39 This doctrine met its end in 1994, in Central 
Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, when the U.S. Supreme 
Court interpreted Rule 10b-5 as attaching liability in private suits only 
to the party who actually made a statement, thereby ending liability for 
aiding and abetting fraudulent misrepresentations.40 Yet the Court in 
Central Bank did not rule out potentially broad interpretations of mak-
ing a statement under Rule 10b-5.41 For example, under broader inter-
pretations, auditors or lawyers who helped prepare the misleading fil-
ings might find themselves on the hook to investors, according to dicta 
from Central Bank.42 Thus, Central Bank’s gutting of aiding and abetting 
 
33 See id. at 691, 693 n.8. 
34 Id. at 691. 
35 Id. at 693 n.8. 
36 Id. (citing Brody, 280 F.3d at 1006). 
37 Id. at 693 n.8. 
38 Reese, 643 F.3d at 693 n.8; see also Janus Capital Grp., 131 S. Ct. at 2303 (defining the 
maker of a statement as the “person or entity with ultimate authority over the statement, 
including its content and whether and how to communicate it”). 
39 See, e.g., Levine v. Diamanthuset, Inc., 950 F.2d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1991); Roberts v. 
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 857 F.2d 646, 652 (9th Cir. 1989). 
40 Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 177 (1994). 
41 Id. at 191; see Louis E. Ebinger, Note, Sarbanes-Oxley Section 501(a): No Implied Private 
Right of Action, and a Call to Congress for an Express Private Right of Action to Enhance Analyst Dis-
closure, 93 Iowa L. Rev. 1919, 1939–40 (2008) (discussing the importance of Central Bank). 
42 Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 191; see Ebinger, supra note 41, at 1939–40. 
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liability caused a good deal of confusion as to who could be liable for 
making a misrepresentation.43 
 Then, in 2011, in Janus Capital Group v. First Derivative Traders, the 
Supreme Court further restricted those who could be held liable in a 
private securities fraud action by defining the word “make” very nar-
rowly, thereby shrinking the sphere of potentially liable parties.44 Spe-
cifically, the Supreme Court wrestled with whether a mutual fund in-
vestment advisor could be held liable for misleading statements 
prepared by the advisor but filed by a related yet independent mutual 
fund.45 In a five-to-four decision, against a vigorous dissent, the Supreme 
Court held that a misleading statement can only be made by an “entity 
with ultimate authority over the statement, including its content and 
whether and how to communicate it.”46 
 In addition to announcing this stringent definition of who can 
“make” a statement under Rule 10b-5, the Janus Capital Group Court 
pressed the policy goal of protecting the “narrow scope that we must 
give the implied private right of action.”47 Although it is uncertain 
whether the Ninth Circuit would have decided Reese differently absent 
the Supreme Court’s policy articulation, the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
furthered that policy.48 
 The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Reese, which prevented the plain-
tiffs from attributing statements in the ORC Agreement to BPXA, pro-
vides a window into possible applications and effects of the Janus Capital 
Group Court’s new doctrine for 10b-5 liability.49 In Janus Capital Group, 
the composition of Janus Investment Fund’s board of directors was 
“more independent than the statute requires.”50 Because of this inde-
pendence, the Supreme Court held that the mutual fund advisor could 
                                                                                                                      
43 See Elizabeth Cosenza, Rethinking Attorney Liability Under Rule 10b-5 in Light of the Su-
preme Court’s Decisions in Tellabs and Stoneridge, 16 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1, 2 (2008). 
44 See Janus Capital Grp. Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302–03 
(2011). 
45 Id. at 2299. 
46 Id. at 2302. 
47 Janus Capital Grp., 131 S. Ct. at 2303. 
48 See id.; Reese v. BP Exploration (Ala.) Inc., 643 F.3d 681, 693 n.8 (9th Cir. 2011). 
This policy goal is not new in Supreme Court securities fraud jurisprudence. See, e.g., Re-
nee M. Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Competition, Cooperation and Securities Enforcement, 11 
Conn. Ins. L.J. 107, 114 (discussing the trend of cases making it more difficult to bring 
securities fraud claims). 
49 Janus Capital Grp., 131 S. Ct. at 2303; see Reese, 643 F.3d at 693 n.8. 
50 Janus Capital Grp., 131 S. Ct. at 2304; see 15 U.S.C. § 80a–10 (2006) (setting mini-
mum standards for representation by independent directors of investment companies). 
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not be the party with ultimate authority over the statements.51 Likewise, 
if the trust agreement did not give BPXA ultimate authority over the 
filings made by the Trust, which included the ORC Agreement, then 
under the principle of Janus Capital Group, BPXA should also rightly 
escape liability.52 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit read the plaintiff’s 
pleadings as not alleging any facts that would show BPXA had ultimate 
authority over the pertinent filings.53 The promise by BPXA to be “re-
sponsible for” the Trust’s SEC filings, the strongest indicator of BPXA’s 
control over the statements, was not an assertion of “ultimate authority” 
over the filings.54 Just as it had been in Janus Capital Group, in Reese, the 
absence of a statutory obligation to file disclosures was fatal.55 
III. Implications of a Requirement of Statutory Obligation 
 The Ninth Circuit’s conclusion, and its use of the strong word “fa-
tal,” substantiates fears raised in Justice Stephen Breyer’s dissent in the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s 2011 decision, Janus Capital Group v. First Deriva-
tive Traders: the ultimate authority standard unduly limits liability for 
securities fraud.56 Specifically, Justice Breyer expressed concern that in 
many cases the party with ultimate authority may not have scienter for 
the misstatement, and those with scienter may not have ultimate au-
thority—leaving no party liable to an investor harmed by a misstate-
ment.57 Furthermore, although Janus Capital Group mentioned the re-
quirement of a statutory obligation in passing, the Ninth Circuit found 
such an obligation to be dispositive.58 In addition, the Supreme Court 
brought up the idea of statutory obligation not when articulating the 
ultimate authority standard, but as part of a recitation of important 
facts while applying the standard.59 
 Under this reasoning, although BPXA was responsible for the 
Trust’s SEC filings, it may not be liable because it lacks a statutory obli-
                                                                                                                      
51 Janus Capital Grp., 131 S. Ct at 2303–04. 
52 See id.; Reese, 643 F.3d at 693 n.8. 
53 Reese, 643 F.3d at 693 n.8. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 See Janus Capital Grp. Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2307–08 
(2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
57 See id. at 2310. 
58 See id. at 2304. The reference to a “statutory obligation” is found in part 2.B of the 
opinion, which is the application of the rule rather than the articulation, and even begins 
“[u]nder this rule.” Id. 
59 See id. 
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gation.60 Taking this reasoning further, if the BPXA is not liable, then 
arguably neither would a lawyer or accountant who helped prepare the 
statements, although these actors were named in the Supreme Court’s 
1994 decision, Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, as 
potentially sharing liability.61 Accordingly, Reese’s added emphasis on 
statutory obligation signals a shift away from the proposition that 
“[a]ny person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who 
. . . makes a material misstatement . . . may be liable as a primary viola-
tor under 10b-5.”62 If liability is limited to those individuals who have 
statutory obligations to file SEC disclosures, scant few will be liable un-
der Rule 10b-5.63 
 If the lack of a statutory obligation is truly fatal, it may present 
troubling loopholes in securities law.64 Assume, for the sake of argu-
ment, that BPXA knew at the time of the execution of the ORC 
Agreement that it never intended to fulfill its promise to operate under 
a prudent standard of care, but the Trust was ignorant of that fact.65 
BPXA can escape all liability under Rule 10b-5 because it was not the 
ultimate authority that made the filings.66 Likewise, the Trust could es-
cape liability because it lacked scienter about BPXA’s lack of care.67 A 
material and knowing misrepresentation would have been made to the 
                                                                                                                      
60 See id. at 2307–08; Reese, 643 F.3d at 693 n.8. 
61 See Janus Capital Grp., 131 S. Ct. at 2307–08; Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate 
Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 177 (1994); Reese, 643 F.3d at 693 n.8. 
62 Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 191. Compare Reese, 643 F.3d at 693 n.8 (noting the lack of a 
statutory obligation to file disclosures with the SEC was “fatal” in a 10b-5 claim), with Cent. 
Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 191 (noting that any party, including lawyers and accountants, may be 
held liable in future 10b-5 claims). Scholarship after Central Bank yet before Janus Capital 
Group largely decried the ambiguous nature of Central Bank’s holding, even going so far as 
to call the circuits’ resulting attempt to define who can exactly be liable for what “schizo-
phrenic jurisprudence.” See Cosenza, supra note 43, at 2; see also Patricia Blanchini, Note, 
The Statement Someone Else Makes May Be Your Own: Primary Liability Under Section 10(b) After 
Central Bank, 71 St. John’s L. Rev. 767, 768 (1997) (“Ultimately, the fundamental ques-
tion left unanswered by Central Bank is what actions of secondary actors in Rule 10b-5 viola-
tions constitute primary violations.”). 
63 See Reese, 643 F.3d at 693 n.8. 
64 See id; see also Janus Capital Grp., 131 S. Ct. at 2310 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing 
the potential for investors harmed by deceptive practices to be unable to find a liable party 
from which to recover). 
65 See Reese, 643 F.3d at 693 n.8. 
66 See Janus Capital Grp., 131 S. Ct. at 2310 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
67 See Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157 (2008) (hold-
ing scienter to be a required element of a private securities fraud action under Rule 10b-5). 
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public, but under Janus Capital Group, no one could be held account-
able.68 
 The above example assumes facts not in the pleadings, for exam-
ple that BPXA knew at the time it signed the contract that it would not 
honor it.69 But the more salient issue for future litigation is what level 
of control a defendant needs over a statement to be subject to liability 
under Rule 10b-5.70 In Reese, merely agreeing to be “responsible” for 
the statements did not meet the ultimate authority standard.71 In part, 
this is a result of the Ninth Circuit’s understanding of Janus Capital 
Group, as placing great weight on a statutory obligation to disclose.72 
Nonetheless, it remains an open question what level of control, if any, a 
court will require before a party is held liable for the statements of an-
other, absent that statutory obligation.73 This ambiguity opens the door 
to further loopholes in an already shrinking scheme of private liabil-
ity.74 
                                                                                                                     
Conclusion 
 The litigation in the Ninth Circuit now has to contend with the 
Reese court’s interpretation of Janus Capital Group. The danger from the 
loophole that Justice Breyer predicted, already an issue that could de-
rail otherwise meritorious litigation, will be enlarged even further as 
the Ninth Circuit continues to regard a lack of a statutory obligation to 
file as fatal to 10b-5 actions. And, perhaps just as importantly, the Ninth 
Circuit is following in the spirit of the Janus Capital Group’s announce-
ment that third party liability in securities fraud actions should be con-
 
68 See Janus Capital Grp, 131 S. Ct. at 2310 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Reese, 643 F.3d at 693 
n.8. 
69 See Reese, 643 F.3d at 686. Although the plaintiffs allege BPXA “had actual knowledge 
of the misrepresentations and omissions of material fact,” there was no mention in the 
opinion that the promise was known to be a misrepresentation when made (that is, when 
BPXA executed the ORC Agreement). See Reese, 643 F.3d at 686, 693. 
70 See id. at 693 n.8. 
71 See id. 
72 See id. 
73 See Janus Capital Crp., 131 S. Ct. at 2310 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Reese, 643 F.3d at 693 
n.8. 
74 See Reese, 643 F.3d at 693 n.8; see also Janus Capital Crp., 131 S. Ct. at 2310 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (discussing the increased likelihood of a party who knowingly deceived inves-
tors escaping liability). Commentators have discussed how other recent Supreme Court 
cases have limited the private right of action under 10b-5 in other contexts. See Elizabeth 
Cosenza, Paradise Lost: § 10(b)-5 After Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 11 Chi. J. Int’l 
L. 343, 395–96 (2011); Vincent Chiapinni, Note, How American Are American Depositary Re-
ceipts? ADRs, Rule 10b-5 Suits, and Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 
1795, 1802–03 (2011). 
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strued all the more narrowly. This case is just one application of that 
policy goal, and it will be important to watch how each circuit does or 
does n
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